Iranian Drones Cost a Fraction of Air Defences. How Long Can Gulf States Last?
In response to the conflict involving the US and Israel, Iran has launched a broad campaign of strikes across multiple fronts. The attacks have targeted Israel and US military installations in the region, as anticipated by Tehran’s prior warnings. Beyond these direct strikes, Iran has also focused on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, hitting critical energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other states.
While some strikes serve as symbolic retribution, aiming to demonstrate resolve after the killing of its supreme leader and numerous officials, others target the economic lifelines of Gulf states. These strikes, particularly those at oil and gas facilities and the Strait of Hormuz, signal Iran’s intent to undermine the financial stability of nations aligned with the West.
Cost Efficiency in Military Strategy
Iran’s approach leverages affordability. Ballistic missiles cost $1–2 million each, but its Shahed drones—designed for self-destructive missions—range from $20,000 to $50,000. This allows Tehran to overwhelm defenses with minimal expenditure, creating a strategic imbalance.
Intercepting these weapons, however, demands a heavy price. Kelly Grieco, a Stimson Center expert, noted that the UAE spent $1.45 billion to $2.28 billion to neutralize attacks, compared to Iran’s $177 million to $360 million. “For every $1 Iran spent on drones, the UAE spent roughly $20–28 shooting them down,” she explained.
“Yet the financial toll of sustaining that defense is enormous, raising the prospect that tactical ‘victory’ masks a costly strategic drain,” Grieco wrote on X.
Gregg Carlstrom of the Economist drew a parallel to the asymmetry in warfare: “It’s like using Ferraris to intercept e-bikes.” The concept of financial attrition, where cheap drones deplete air defense resources, isn’t new. Russia has employed similar tactics in Ukraine, using mass-produced Shahed drones to saturate enemy systems.
These drones are not only inexpensive but also rapidly deployable. Their affordability contrasts sharply with the cost of intercepting them, which often requires advanced systems with complex supply chains. In Ukraine, Kyiv initially relied on high-end systems like the Patriot, but later shifted to more economical options such as the Gerald, a Cold War-era anti-aircraft gun.
“This means that the air defences are sometimes absolutely on top of the incoming drones (and frequently the accompanying missiles) and on other occasions more get through,” Jordan told Middle East Eye.
David Jordan, a King’s College London lecturer, highlighted the cyclical nature of drone warfare innovations. Ukrainian forces adapted by retrofitting An-28 transport aircraft with Miniguns and deploying electronic warfare to disrupt drone signals. These strategies reflect the evolving challenge of countering cost-effective, high-volume attacks.
As the conflict continues, the sustainability of high interception rates by Israel, the US, and Gulf states remains uncertain. Israel, for instance, often permits drone impacts in open zones to conserve resources. Meanwhile, the US scrambles to eliminate Iran’s missile and drone capabilities before its defense stockpiles are exhausted.
The broader implications are clear: Iran’s ability to sustain such a campaign hinges on its low-cost arsenal, while its adversaries face escalating financial demands to maintain operational readiness. Whether this dynamic can be sustained without significant strain on Gulf nations’ budgets remains to be seen.
